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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between immigration and offshoring by examining whether
an influx of foreign workers reduces the need for firms to relocate jobs abroad. We exploit a Danish
quasi-natural experiment in which immigrants were randomly allocated to municipalities using a
refugee dispersal policy and we use the Danish employer-employee matched data set covering the
universe of workers and firms over the period 1995-2011. Our findings show that an exogenous
influx of immigrants into a municipality reduces firm-level offshoring at both the extensive and
intensive margins. The fact that immigration and offshoring are substitutes has important policy
implications, since restrictions on one may encourage the other. While the multilateral relationship
is negative, a subsequent bilateral analysis shows that immigrants have connections in their country
of origin that increase the likelihood that firms offshore to that particular foreign country.
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1 Introduction
Immigration and offshoring are two of the most contentious components of globalization.1 A protec-
tionist backlash against globalization is occurring in many countries, in part due to concerns about
immigration and offshoring. While there are numerous studies examining the determinants and eco-
nomic implications of each of these global forces, there is little research investigating the relationship
between the two. This is unfortunate since restricting immigration could have important implications
for offshoring and visa versa. Our paper fills this gap by exploring whether an exogenous influx of
immigrants into a municipality affects the offshoring decisions of local firms.
Offshoring, or the relocation of domestic jobs abroad, is often motivated by the firm’s desire to
reduce labor costs, to move production closer to foreign consumers, or to utilize a foreign workforce
with a different skill set.2 The firm weighs these benefits against the inherent challenges associated
with offshoring, which include the difficulty of monitoring production activities abroad, the need to
transport intermediate goods between countries, and the foreign connections and familiarity with
foreign business environments required to offshore. Immigration into a municipality may influence the
local firm’s decision to offshore in a couple of ways.
First, an influx of foreign workers may reduce the need for domestic firms to relocate jobs abroad.
Specifically, firms located in areas that have an abundant supply of new immigrant workers may have
less incentive to offshore. Rather than employing foreign workers abroad through offshore production,
which is logistically difficult, the firm can instead hire immigrant workers domestically. In a fundamen-
tal sense, the foreign workers have migrated to the domestic jobs rather than the jobs being relocated
abroad. According to this view, which we will refer to as the labor supply effect, immigration and
offshoring are substitutes.
There is anecdotal evidence supporting this hypothesis. For instance, there were concerns that
the restrictions to H1B visas proposed in the 2013 U.S. Immigration Bill would have the unintended
consequence of forcing U.S. firms to offshore jobs abroad.3 Similarly, Brexit may limit the inflow of
European Union (EU) migrant workers into the U.K. which could inadvertently encourage British
firms to offshore production activities abroad.4 In Denmark the pork industry has offshored much
of its production due in part to their reluctance, compared to the their German competitors, to hire
immigrant workers (Wagner and Refslund, 2016). While these sentiments and concerns are common,
there is limited evidence showing that immigration and offshoring are substitutes.
Second, immigration can influence offshoring decisions through the information and connections
1American workers list offshoring and immigration as the two factors of greatest concern to them (“Public Says
American Work Life is Worsening, But Most Workers Remain Satisfied with Their Jobs,” Pew Research Center, 2006.)
2Offshoring can occur within or outside the boundaries of the firm (i.e. outsourcing). However, this distinction
between offshoring to foreign affiliates or foreign arms-length suppliers is less important for our purposes than the simple
fact that production is being relocated abroad. Our main offshoring measure will include both types of offshoring, but
we also find similar results using an FDI-based measure of offshoring that only includes offshoring within the boundaries
of the firm (see Table 10).
3“Why India is Irked by the U.S. Immigration Bill” Knowledge@Wharton, July 8, 2013.
4As The Economist says in their article “Brexit’s Labour Pains” (January 14, 2017): “If Britain’s firms cannot import
enough workers, the country may simply export their jobs.”
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that immigrants often have with their country of origin. Local firms may utilize this expertise and
these networks to offshore stages of production to the immigrant’s country of origin. Thus, at the
bilateral level immigration may actually encourage offshoring. According to this view, which we will
refer to as the bilateral network effect, immigration and offshoring will be complements. A positive
bilateral relationship and a negative multilateral relationship between immigration and offshoring are
not incompatible since network effects are country specific while labor supply effects are strongest at
the multilateral level.5
We study the relationship between immigration and offshoring in Denmark, which provides an ap-
pealing quasi-natural experiment for researchers. First, ‘push factors’ in a number of foreign countries
led to a rapid and exogenous increase in the flow of immigrants into Denmark. For instance, unrest in
Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and the European Union enlarge-
ment in the 2000s both increased Danish immigration. Second, once immigrants were in Denmark
they were often allocated to municipalities according to the refugee Spatial Dispersal Policy, which
had little regard for immigrant preferences or local economic conditions (Damm and Dustmann, 2014;
Foged and Peri, 2016). Third, subsequent waves of immigrants often settled in the randomly assigned
Danish municipalities that their countrymen were initially allocated to based on the Spatial Dispersal
Policy. These features of Danish immigration provide a unique opportunity to identify exogenous
shocks to immigration within municipalities.6
An added benefit of focusing on Denmark is that it has a detailed employer-employee matched data
set covering the universe of firms and the entire population of workers within Denmark over the years
1995-2011. This data is well-suited for our analysis since it contains comprehensive information about
the individual characteristics of workers, including their country of birth. Furthermore, it also has
detailed employer information which, among other things, allows us to measure offshoring at the firm-
level within municipalities. This represents a significant improvement over industry-level measures of
offshoring that are common in the literature, since offshoring tends to be highly firm-specific (Hummels
et al., 2014). In sum, the unique features of Danish immigration and the availability of this detailed
data set offer an ideal opportunity to examine how immigration shocks affect firm-level offshoring
decisions.
The results show that an increase in the share of non-EU immigrants within a municipality re-
duces firm-level offshoring, after accounting for a variety of firm, industry, municipality, and workforce
characteristics.7 To address endogeneity concerns, we employ a ‘shift share’ instrumental variable
approach that identifies an exogenous source of variation in immigration based on the tendency for
immigrants to settle in municipalities where their countrymen previously located (Card, 2001). The
5Immigration may also lead to a “productivity effect” (Ottaviano et al., 2018) which refers to the cost saving (or
productivity enhancing) effects of immigration, which in turn may influence offshoring decisions. The direction of this
effect is ambiguous since more productive firms may be more successful at overcoming the fixed costs of offshoring or
they may be less likely to offshore since their domestic production is now less costly. We control for firm productivity
throughout our analysis, which allows us to carefully focus on the labor supply and network effects of interest.
6Typically European labor markets are relatively rigid, however Denmark has one of the most flexible labor markets
in the world, on par with the U.S. (Hummels et al., 2014; Foged and Peri, 2016).
7Given the exogenous ‘push factors’ and the dispersal policy we focus on non-EU immigration, but results obtained
using broader or narrower immigrant groups are similar (see section 6.2).
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specific features of Danish immigration during this period, including exogenous ‘push factors’ and the
Spatial Dispersal Policy, make this common instrumental variable approach even more appealing in
our context. We find immigration reduces both the extensive margin of offshoring (i.e. the likelihood
that the firm offshores at all) and the intensive margin of offshoring (i.e. how much the firm offshores).
Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the share of immigrants within a municipality reduces
the extensive margin of offshoring by 12.7% and reduces the intensive margin of offshoring by 2.1%.
Additional results show that these findings differ in sensible ways across sectors, with immigration
having a larger impact on offshoring in labor intensive industries and in those industries where off-
shoring is more feasible.8 Overall, these findings confirm the labor supply effect by showing that an
exogenous influx of immigrants into a municipality reduces the need for firms to offshore jobs abroad.
While these multilateral results show that immigration and offshoring are substitutes, we also
examine whether immigrants possess knowledge or connections that help local firms offshore to the
immigrant’s country of origin. Consistent with our network effect hypothesis, we find that an exogenous
influx of immigrants increases the likelihood that a firm in that municipality will begin offshoring to
the immigrant’s country of origin (i.e. the extensive margin of offshoring). However, there is no
impact of bilateral immigration on the intensive margin of offshoring, which is consistent with the idea
that immigrants help the firm overcome the fixed costs associated with initially relocating production
abroad but have little impact on offshoring volumes once the firm has already established business
connections of it’s own in the foreign country. While bilateral offshoring increases with immigration
from the same foreign country, we confirm that it decreases with immigration from all other countries,
which reconciles our bilateral and multilateral findings. Overall we find evidence that immigration
substitutes for offshoring at the multilateral level due to the labor supply effect but complements
offshoring at the bilateral level due to the network effect.
While our primary focus is on immigration and offshoring, we also explore the relationship be-
tween immigration and international trade. Our findings show that immigration has no impact on
imports into a municipality, which confirms that our offshoring results are not simply due to a gen-
eral relationship between immigration and imports. We also find that immigration has no impact on
exports from a municipality. However, our results do show that bilateral immigration increases both
imports from and exports to the immigrant’s country of origin. The network effect that encourages
offshoring to the immigrant’s country of origin is also, not surprisingly, useful in facilitating trade.
Our paper makes a number of important contributions. First, our findings support a growing
body of evidence showing that immigration influences firm behavior. For instance, research has found
that immigrant-induced labor supply shocks can cause firm’s to use more labor intensive technologies
or to expand production activities in response (Acemoglu, 1998; Lewis, 2011; Olney, 2013; Dustmann
and Glitz, 2015). We contribute to this literature by showing that firm-level offshoring, at both the
intensive and extensive margins, declines in response to immigration. This reduction in offshoring
increases local labor demand, which together with the direct immigrant-induced increase in labor
supply, could explain why immigration is found to have no negative impact on wages in Denmark
8In addition, our results are robust to measuring offshoring in a variety of different ways as shown in section 6.3.
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(Foged and Peri, 2016) and in other contexts (Card, 2005).
Second, our results contribute to an existing literature that finds that immigrants help facilitate
trade to their country of origin through knowledge, language, contacts, and networks (Gould, 1994;
Head and Ries, 1998; Rauch and Trindade, 2002; Peri and Requena-Silvente, 2010). Not only do we
confirm these trade findings in our context, but we show that immigration also increases offshoring
to the immigrant’s country of origin. However, these bilateral results are only part of the story. In
addition to the complementary effects at the bilateral level, we find that immigration and offshoring
are substitutes at the multilateral level.
Third, our examination of arguably the two most important and contentious components of glob-
alization is similar in spirit to Ottaviano et al. (2013) and Olney (2012) who also look at immigration
and offshoring in a unified framework but focus on the employment and wage ramifications for na-
tives. Ottaviano et al. (2013) also find that immigration reduces the employment share of offshoring
in U.S. manufacturing industries, which suggests that the two are substitutes at the multilateral level.
However in contrast to their earlier results, Ottaviano et al. (2018) find using a sample of U.K. service
firms that immigration and offshoring are complements at the multilateral level but substitutes at the
bilateral level. Our analysis attempts to clarify these conflicting findings in the literature by exploiting
the unique features of Danish immigration and using our detailed employer-employee matched data
set covering the universe of firms and workers in all industries. We find that immigration generates a
labor supply effect that reduces offshoring, which is consistent Ottaviano et al. (2013) but in contrast
to Ottaviano et al. (2018). We also find that bilateral immigration generates a network effect that in-
creases bilateral offshoring, which is not pursued by Ottaviano et al. (2013) and differs from Ottaviano
et al. (2018) who focus on the offshoring of service tasks which may be more country-specific.9
The paper is organized in the following manner. In section 2 we discuss the data and the unique
features of the Danish immigration experience which make this an appealing quasi-natural experiment
to study. We also define and present descriptive statistics of our key measures of immigration and
offshoring. Our empirical approach is explained in section 3, which also includes a discussion of
our identification strategy. Section 4 presents evidence showing that immigration generates a labor
supply effect which reduces offshoring at both the intensive and extensive margins. We complement
this key finding by showing in section 5 that immigration also generates a bilateral network effect
which increases the likelihood that firms offshore to the immigrant’s country of origin. Finally, we
examine the impact of immigration on international trade in section 6, and also show that our results
are robust to alternate measures of immigration, alternate measures of offshoring, and to the use of
different samples of firms and municipalities.
2 Data
Our empirical analysis examines the relationship between immigration and offshoring using an
employer-employee matched data from Statistics Denmark. In this section we provide an overview of
9These differences are discussed in greater detail in section 5.
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the data sources and we document how immigration and offshoring have evolved over time and across
geographic municipalities within Denmark.
2.1 Data Sources
Our data set is constructed by merging information from three different sources. First, firm-level
data comes from the Firm Statistics Register (FirmStat henceforth), which covers the universe of
private-sector firms over the years 1995-2011. FirmStat has detailed information on the industry10
and location of the firm within Denmark, which is important for our analysis.11 In addition, FirmStat
has detailed information on a variety of firm characteristics, such as productivity, capital intensity,
and foreign ownership.12 Accounting for these time varying firm-specific characteristics allows us to
more carefully isolate the impact of immigration on offshoring.13
Second, worker-level data is provided by the Integrated Database for Labor Market Research
(IDA henceforth) which covers the entire Danish working population over the period 1980-2011. Im-
portantly, IDA provides information on each individual’s country of birth, which allows us to measure
the immigrant share of the workforce within a municipality. In addition, IDA provides a number of
useful workforce characteristics such as average education, age, tenure, gender, and work experience
of employees. Using the Firm-Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (FIDA) every worker
in IDA is linked to every firm in FirmStat data using a unique identifier. This generates an employer-
employee matched data set covering the universe of private-sector firms and the population of Danish
workers.
Third, trade data comes from the Foreign Trade Statistics Register and consists of two parts,
the Intrastat (within EU trade) and the Extrastat (trade with non-EU countries). Exports and
imports are measured at the firm-level for the years 1995-2011, which will be used to construct our
offshoring measure and offers immediate advantages over industry-level trade data often used in the
literature. Furthermore, this trade data is available by foreign country and detailed product level
(8-digit Combined Nomenclature), which is useful for our bilateral and industry level analyses. The
Foreign Trade Statistics data is linked to the FirmStat and FIDA data using the same unique firm
identifier.
10The firms industry is classified according to the 2-digit Danish code (http :
//www.danmarksstatistik.dk/da/Statistik/dokumentation/nomenklaturer/dansk − branchekode − db07). Statistics
Denmark assigns an industrial code based on the main (core) activity performed by the firm. The industry code can
vary over time within a firm.
11In the dataset, the location of multi-establishment firms is determined by the municipality of the headquarter
establishment. Multi-establishment firms constitute only 9% of our sample, we control for them throughout, and we
confirm in Table 11 that our results are similar if these firms are dropped from the sample entirely.
12Labor productivity is calculated as sales per employee in logarithmic scale. The capital stock comprises
the sum of land, buildings, machines, equipment and inventory (in Danish kroner). Foreign ownership is a bi-
nary variable based on the company’s ownership form provided by the Central Business Register (found here
https://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/dokumentation/Times/generel-firmastatistik1/gf-virkfkod-1). We deflate all monetary
values using the World Bank’s GDP deflator with 2005 as the base year.
13FirmStat imputes some balance sheet variables for a limited number of small firms with fewer than 50 employees.
Our results are robust to either excluding just these observations or excluding all firms with fewer than 50 employees
(results available upon request).
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Combining these different data sources generates an unbalanced panel of approximately 35,000
firms and 1 million workers, spanning 70 different industries and 97 Danish municipalities over the
period 1995-2011.14 The ability to link firm-level trade data with an employer-employee matched
data set provides a unique opportunity to examine how immigration into a local labor market affects
offshoring decisions of firms within that municipality.
2.2 Immigration
We begin by calculating the the share of foreign-born workers in Denmark and document how this
share has evolved over time. Figure 1 shows that in 1994 the immigrant share of the workforce in
Denmark was about 2.5 percent but by 2011 it had increased to over 6 percent. The fact that the
share of foreign workers more than doubled in Denmark in a relatively short period represents a unique
opportunity to examine the economic implications of immigration.
Our empirical analysis focuses on non-EU immigrants, who for a number of reasons are an ap-
pealing segment of the immigrant population to study.15 First, Figure 1 shows that nearly all of
the increase in immigration over this period is driven by an influx of foreign workers from non-EU
countries, while EU immigration has remained relatively flat. For instance, in 1994 EU and non-EU
immigrants comprised the same share of the workforce (slightly more than 1 percent) but by the end
of our sample the non-EU immigrant share was double that of the EU share (more than 4 percent
compared to less than 2 percent). Non-EU immigration is the driving force behind the rapid increase
in the share of foreign workers in Denmark.
Second, the growth in non-EU immigration into Denmark during this period was largely driven
by exogenous factors, such as conflict and unrest in some foreign countries during the 1990s and by
European Union enlargement in the 2000s. To illustrate this point, Figure 2 shows the growth rate in
immigration from a variety of non-EU countries since 1995. There was a rapid increase in immigrants
from countries experiencing instability in the 1990s, such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, and the former
Yugoslavia. However, immigrant inflows from these countries plateaued during the 2000s. We also
see that immigration inflows increased from countries that joined the European Union. For instance,
immigration from Poland increased after the country joined the EU in 2004 and immigration from
Romania and Bulgaria increased after 2007 when both countries joined the EU. The country-specific
variation illustrated in Figure 2 indicates that the rapid growth in non-EU immigration does not
appear to be motivated by domestic economic conditions in Denmark, which could be correlated with
offshoring decisions. Instead, this evidence suggests that the growth in Danish immigration during
this period is driven by external ‘push-factors’ in foreign countries.16
14We exclude firms with only 1 employee, to avoid self-employment. We also exclude firms that relocate within
Denmark. However, the inclusion of these mobile firms in our analysis does not affect our findings, as shown in Table
11. Our analysis focuses on 97 Danish municipalities, which combines Frederiksberg and Copenhagen following Foged
and Peri (2016).
15Our definition of non-EU immigrants includes foreign workers from all countries outside the EU15 (not counting
Denmark itself the EU15 countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).
16Figure 10 provides additional details on the origin countries of Danish immigrants and the destination countries of
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Figure 1: Foreign Born Share in Denmark by Area of Origin
1
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year
Total EU Non_EU
Notes: Share of migrant workers by area of origin calculated using data from Danish
Integrated Database for Labor Market Research.
Third, since offshoring often, although not always, entails the relocation of routine, lower-skilled
tasks abroad (Hummels et al., 2014; Ebenstein et al., 2014; Becker et al., 2013), firm-level offshoring
decisions may be more responsive to non-EU immigration. Demographic characteristics reported in
Table 1 show that non-EU immigrant workers are on average younger, have less education, and are
more likely to work blue-collar routine jobs compared to natives and EU immigrants. For instance,
non-EU immigrants are on average 38 years old while EU immigrants are 44 years old. Similarly,
30 percent of non-EU immigrants have a primary education (14 percent for EU immigrants) and 80
percent work blue collar jobs (66 percent for EU immigrants).
Fourth, a significant portion of the growth in non-EU immigration was due to inflows of immi-
grants from refugee countries that were experiencing instability in the 1990s (see Figure 2). The
Danish Government followed a Spatial Dispersal Policy which randomly allocated these refugees to
municipalities within Denmark over a thirteen year period from 1986-1998 (see Damm (2009) and
Damm and Dustmann (2014) for additional details about this program). The goal of this policy was
to evenly disperse immigrants across the country roughly in proportion to the number of existing
inhabitants.17 The program asked immigrants to provide their birth date, family size, and nationality,
but importantly the ultimate location decision was not influenced by the skill-level of the immigrant,
Danish offshoring.
17This type of spatial distribution policy has been used in other countries as well, such as Germany (Glitz, 2012)
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Figure 2: Growth Rate of Immigrants by Country of Origin since 1995
0
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year
Afghanistan Iran Iraq Somalia
Former Yugo Bulgaria Poland Romania
Notes: Growth rate from 1995 in the number of migrant workers from each foreign
country calculated using data from the Danish Integrated Database for Labor Market
Research.
their geographic preferences, or the economic conditions of the Danish municipality. While national
clusters of immigrants did emerge, this was largely due to the random timing of immigrant inflows
and the availability of housing in that year (Foged and Peri, 2016). Thus, the Spatial Dispersal Policy
generates variation in immigration across municipalities that is independent of local economic condi-
tions, which could be endogenous. Immigrants were encouraged to stay in their assigned municipality
and had strong incentives to do so since they received social assistance and language courses there,
however there were no formal restrictions on subsequent relocation (Damm and Dustmann, 2014).
Furthermore, even after the Spatial Dispersal Policy officially ended, new immigrants had connections
that often led them to locate in the randomly assigned municipalities that their countrymen were
initially allocated to (Bartel, 1989).
Figure 3 shows the percent change in the non-EU immigrant share across municipalities over
our sample period. First note that there is substantial geographic variation in immigration which is
important for our empirical analysis. We also see that new immigrants dispersed across Denmark in
a more or less random way, which is consistent with the goals of the Spatial Dispersal Policy. For
instance, the municipality of Lemvig on the west coast of Denmark saw their non-EU immigrant share
increase by 126 percent, while the similar neighboring municipality of Hostelbro saw it’s share increase
by half as much (61 percent). It is not the case that immigration increased more rapidly in urban
areas, like Copenhagen in the east, which would be concerning if offshoring is also more common in
9
these municipalities. The historical features of Danish immigration, including both the exogenous
‘push factors’ and this random geographic variation, represent a unique quasi-natural experiment
which allows us to examine the causal impact of immigration on firm-level offshoring decisions. Our
subsequent instrumental variable approach more carefully isolates these useful sources of variation in
the data.
Figure 3: Percent Change (1995 to 2011) in the Share of Non-EU Immigrants by Municipality
[-27.2,51.5]
(51.5,66.4]
(66.4,75.0]
(75.0,87.8]
(87.8,127.6]
Notes: Share of non-EU migrant workers calculated using data from the Danish Integrated Database for Labor
Market Research.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the variation in the supply of immigrants across local labor
markets, illustrated in Figure 3, rather than on immigrant employment shares within the firm.18 This
approach exploits the exogeneity of the dispersal policy, which allocated immigrants across municipal-
ities, and it avoids endogenous hiring decisions of the firm.19 Thus, we measure the non-EU immigrant
share of employment in municipality m and year t. Specifically, our immigration measures Imgnon−EUmt
is calculated as FnonEUmt /Pmt, where F
non−EU
mt is the stock of immigrant workers of non-EU origin and
Pmt is total employment in municipality m and year t. Our empirical specification will examine how
changes this share immigrants within a municipality effects the offshoring decisions of local firms.
Additional results show that our findings are robust to a variety of other ways of constructing this
immigration variable, including as the share of total immigrants, the refugee and new-EU immigrant
18Measuring immigration within local labor markets is preferable even when firm-level data on immigration is available
(Foged and Peri, 2016; Dustmann and Glitz, 2015).
19Offshoring decisions likely respond to the pool of available workers within a local labor market and not just the
workers that the firm ultimately chooses to hire. While using the municipality as our unit of analysis is preferable, we
confirm in Table 9 that the results are similar if we use the share of non-EU immigrant workers at the firm instead.
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share, the non-EU low-skilled immigrant share, or the firm-level non-EU immigrant share (see section
6.2 and Table 9).
2.3 Offshoring
Using data from the Foreign Trade Statistics Register, we construct a firm-level measure of offshoring.
We follow the well-established method of measuring offshoring using detailed import data first proposed
by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) at the industry-level and then measured at the firm-level by Hummels
et al. (2014). This approach is supported by survey data which indicates that 95 percent of Danish firms
that offshore to a particular region also import from that region (Bernard et al., 2017a).20 Another
appealing aspect of this measure is that it captures offshoring within and outside the boundaries of
the firm, by including imports from both arms-length suppliers and from foreign affiliates.
We construct a “narrow offshoring” measure that is defined as the summation of imports in the
same HS4 category as firm production.21 Focusing on imports within the same detailed product code,
increases the likelihood that the firm could have previously produced these products domestically
which is consistent with the concept of offshoring. For instance, this narrow measure of offshoring
does not include imported raw materials that may be used in domestic production but are obviously
less compatible with standard definitions of offshoring.
Measuring offshoring at the firm-level is appealing. First, there is significant heterogeneity in
offshoring across otherwise similar firms within the same industry (Hummels et al., 2014). This
suggests that an industry-level measure of offshoring constructed using input-output tables is missing
important variation in the data. Furthermore, firm-level offshoring allows us to control for observed
and unobserved firm characteristics that could be related to both offshoring and immigration. Our
offshoring measure can also be constructed for each foreign destination country, which will be exploited
in our bilateral analysis. For all of these reasons, firm-level measures are considered the “gold standard”
of offshoring variables (Hummels et al., 2016).
Our results are similar using other offshoring measures, such as a “broad offshoring” measure or
a conceptually distinct foreign-direct-investment based measure of offshoring (see Table 10). We also
show that our results are similar when examining offshoring in manufacturing and service industries
separately, but they are stronger in labor intensive industries and in industries where offshoring is
more feasible (see Table 6). Furthermore, in section 6.1 we show that our measure of offshoring is not
driven by a more general relationship between immigration and aggregate imports. All of these findings
indicate that our measure of offshoring is accurately capturing firm-specific offshoring decisions.
Our analysis will focus on two dimensions of offshoring. First, we are interested in the firm’s
initial decision to offshore production activities abroad (i.e. the extensive margin of offshoring). This
20While these imports are often final goods rather than intermediate inputs (Bernard et al., 2017a), for our purposes
the type of imports matter less than the simple fact that the firm has offshored production activities abroad. To the
extent that Danish firms offshore production and then sell the output in foreign markets, our import-based measure of
offshoring will be an underestimate.
21Given the richness of the data, for multi-product firms we are able to sum imports across all of the HS4 products
that the firm produces.
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requires the firm to weigh the benefits of lower foreign labor costs, for instance, against the drawbacks
associated with coordinating and monitoring production abroad. To measure these extensive margin
adjustments we define offshoring as a binary variable equaling one if the firm offshores to any foreign
country. Second, we are in interested in whether the firm’s volume of offshoring changes (i.e. the
intensive margin of offshoring). We measure this dimension of offshoring using the natural log of
offshoring volumes, conditional on the firm offshoring.
We expect that the labor supply effect will cause immigration to reduce both the extensive and
intensive margins of offshoring. After an immigrant-induced increase in labor supply within the mu-
nicipality, firms will have less incentive to offshore since the foreign workers have migrated to them.22
However, the bilateral network effect likely influences the extensive and intensive margins of offshoring
differently. Firms will find the immigrant’s connections with their country of origin useful when they
initially begin to offshore. However, if the firm already has offshored to the foreign country, they will
have business connections of their own, and thus the intensive margin of offshoring should be less
sensitive to immigration.
Figure 4 presents evidence on the prevalence of offshoring across Danish industries. We find that
offshoring is common in industries such as Motor Vehicles, Machinery and Equipment, and Textiles
where almost forty percent of firms offshore. This is consistent with evidence showing that offshoring
of routine, blue-collar jobs is relatively common (Hummels et al., 2014; Ebenstein et al., 2014; Becker
et al., 2013). Using a totally different measure of offshoring based on survey data, Bernard et al. (2017a)
also find that offshoring is relatively common in these three industries which provides external validity
for our offshoring measure. Our results also indicate, not surprisingly, that offshoring is uncommon
in industries such as Health Care and Accommodation and Food Services. This is consistent with
Ottaviano et al. (2018) who find very little trade in these two service industries, which again provides
an external check of our offshoring measure. Ultimately, we find this industry variation sensible, it
is consistent with existing evidence, and it indicates that our measure is successfully capturing useful
variation in offshoring.
Figure 5 shows basic time-series variation in the share of non-EU immigration (top panel) and
the share of offshoring firms (bottom panel) over the last twenty five years in Denmark. While the
variation in non-EU immigration is familiar from Figure 1, the bottom panel shows a long-run upward
trend in Danish offshoring, which increases from about 11 percent in 1998 to about 15 percent in 2011.
However, around this trend there are interesting fluctuations. For instance, in two periods (1995-1998
and 2004-2006) there is an increase in the share of non-EU immigrants due to foreign push factors
while at the same time offshoring appears to decline. Of course strong inferences are challenging in
basic time-series figures, but this suggests that immigration and offshoring may be related even at the
national level.
22In addition, immigration may initially reduce domestic wages, which undermines the cost-saving motivation of
offshoring. However, a reduction in offshoring in turn increases local labor demand, which implies that equilibrium
wages ultimately may not decrease in response to immigration (as found in Foged and Peri (2016)). Alternatively, if the
motivation for offshoring is to locate production closer to foreign consumers, then firms’ offshoring decisions will be less
responsive to immigration which will work against our findings.
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Figure 4: Offshoring by Industry
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Notes: Share of offshoring firms (narrow definition) within each 2-digit Danish industry code (1995-
2011) calculated using data from the Danish Foreign Trade Statistics Register.
We now turn to the geographic variation in offshoring, as we did with immigration. Figure 6 shows
how the prevalence of offshoring changed from 1995 to 2011 across different Danish municipalities.
First, note that there is substantial geographic variation in offshoring across Denmark, which is useful
for our empirical analysis. Second, the municipalities that experienced the largest increase in offshoring
do not, for instance, seem to be clustered around Copenhagen. Furthermore, it appears in Figures
3 and 6 that those municipalities which saw a substantial long-run increase in immigration do not
experience long-run increases in offshoring. This points to a negative relationship which will be tested
more formally in the analysis that follows.
2.4 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics of our main offshoring, workforce, and firm variables over the period 1995-2011
are presented in Table 2. Thirteen percent of firms engage in offshoring according to our narrow
measure, while twenty six percent do so according to our broad measure. Focusing on the intensive
margin of offshoring, we see that the average volume of offshoring is about 90,000 Danish Krone.
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Figure 5: Immigration and Offshoring Time-Series Variation
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Notes: Share of non-EU migrant workers calculated using the Danish Integrated Database for Labor
Market Research and share of firms that offshore (narrow definition) calculated using data from the
Danish Foreign Trade Statistics Register.
Our key independent variable is the share of non-EU immigrant workers in the municipality,
which over our sample represents slightly more than 3 percent of the workforce. However, this masks
substantial variation over time and across municipalities. For instance, the non-EU immigrant share
ranges from about 1 percent in 1994 to over 4 percent in 2011 and from 0.005 percent in the municipality
of Morsø to 12.35 percent in the municipality of Ishø. Both this time-series variation (seen in Figure
1) and the geographic variation (seen in Figure 3) in immigration will be useful for our empirical
analysis.
Given the detailed employer-employee data set we are also able to account for many relevant
workforce and firm characteristics. Specifically, we account for the average gender, age, education,
tenure, and work experience of employees at the firm. As reported in Table 2, workers are 72 percent
male (men are more heavily concentrated in the private sector) and are on average 39.5 years old
with 11.8 years of education and 13.5 years of experience, which includes 5.6 years at their current
firm. We also account for a variety of firm characteristics, such as productivity, size, capital intensity,
multi-establishment status, and foreign ownership status. We see in Table 2 that 10 percent of firms
14
Figure 6: Percent Change (1995 to 2011) in the Share of Firms that Offshore by Municipality
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Notes: Share of firms that offshore (narrow definition) calculated using data from the Danish Foreign Trade
Statistics Register.
have more than fifty employees, 9 percent are multi-establishment firms, and 0.3 percent are foreign
owned.
To provide preliminary insight into the main relationship of interest, we plot the share of non-EU
immigrants against offshoring at the extensive (Figure 7) and intensive (Figure 8) margins within
the municipality. In both scatter plots, a statistically significant negative relationship is evident.
Consistent with the predictions from the labor supply effect, an increase in the share of non-EU
immigrants is associated with a decline in both the likelihood that a firm offshores and the volume
of firm offshoring within that municipality. It is encouraging that significant negative relationships
emerge in such raw cuts of the data. We now examine whether this relationship holds in a more
rigorous empirical specification.
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Figure 7: Extensive Margin of Offshoring and Share of Non-EU Immigrants
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Notes: Share of firms that offshore (narrow definition) in a given municipality and
year is reported on the vertical axis. Share of non-EU migrant workers in a given
municipality and year is reported on the horizontal axis.
3 Empirical Strategy
This sections outlines our estimation approach and identification strategy used to test for the labor
supply effect. Later in section 5 we will discuss how this specification is altered in order to test for
the bilateral network effect.
3.1 Specification
Our estimation strategy examines how a firm’s offshoring decisions respond to the share of immigrants
within the municipality. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
Offijmt = β0 + β1Img
non−EU
mt−1 +X
′
ijmt−1δ1 +W
′
ijmt−1δ2 + γi + γj + γm + γt + ijmt (1)
where the dependent variable, Offijmt, is offshoring at firm i, in industry j, located in municipality m,
and in year t. Our analysis initially focuses on narrow offshoring at both the extensive and intensive
margin, but also uses other measures of offshoring in section 6.3.
Our main independent variable, Imgnon−EUmt−1 , is the non-EU immigrant share of the workforce in
municipality m and year t−1. Immigration and the other independent variables are lagged to account
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Figure 8: Intensive Margin of Offshoring and Share of Non-EU Immigrants
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Notes: Log of offshoring (narrow definition) from a given municipality and year is
reported on the vertical axis. Share of non-EU migrant workers in a given municipality
and year is reported on the horizontal axis.
for the fact that companies cannot immediately adjust offshoring decisions in response to changing
economic conditions.23 According to the labor supply effect, an influx of foreign workers will reduce
the need for firms to relocate jobs abroad (β1 < 0).
24
The vector Xijmt−1 includes a set of firm characteristics that could influence offshoring decisions.
Specifically, we include firm-level productivity, capital intensity, and foreign ownership, as well as firm
size dummies and a multi-establishment dummy.25 We anticipate that offshoring will increase with
productivity, capital intensity, size, and foreign ownership.
The vector Wijmt−1 includes detailed workforce characteristics, such as average education, age,
tenure, work experience, and gender. Since some of these factors could be correlated with immigration
itself, we report findings with and without these additional demographic characteristics. Finally, we
incorporate a comprehensive set of fixed effects including firm fixed effects (γi), industry fixed effects
23Our results are similar using longer lag structures or assuming a non-linear impact of immigration on offshoring
(results available upon request).
24Native outflow could also increase the immigrant share. However, this would reduce the labor supply within the
municipality, which should encourage offshoring and thus work against our findings. To the extent that natives leave in
response to immigration, then the local labor supply will not change, offshoring decisions will be unaffected, and our
results will be attenuated.
25The inclusion of productivity in our estimating equation controls for the potential “productivity effect” associated
with immigration (Ottaviano et al., 2018) and allows us to focus more carefully on the labor supply and network effects.
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(γj), municipality fixed effects (γm), and year fixed effects (γt).
26 Finally, the standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level.
3.2 Identification
Unobserved municipality-specific shocks could be correlated with both immigration and offshoring. For
instance, municipalities that are becoming more cosmopolitan and global may experience an influx of
immigrants and be more likely to offshore production activities abroad. This most obvious source of
endogeneity will, if anything, introduce a spurious positive bias in our immigration coefficient which
will attenuate our negative findings. Nonetheless, we pursue an instrumental variable approach that
identifies the causal effect of immigration on firm-level offshoring by isolating plausibly exogenous
variation in immigration.
As discussed, three historical features of Danish immigration during this period inform our instru-
mental variable approach. First, the majority of new Danish immigrants came from non-EU countries
where conflict, instability, or policy changes (i.e. EU membership) led them to migrate. Importantly,
it was not features of the Danish economy that caused these new immigrant inflows. Second, once in
Denmark, the Spatial Dispersal Policy (Damm, 2009; Damm and Dustmann, 2014) randomly assigned
many non-EU refugees to Danish municipalities. Thus, these new immigrants were not choosing a
municipality based on local economic conditions. Third, through official family reunification policies
and informal networks, subsequent waves of immigrants often settled in municipalities where family
and friends from the same source country were initially randomly located (Foged and Peri (2016)).
Our instrumental variable approach exploits these features of this quasi-natural experiment. The
instrument takes advantage of the fact that foreign shocks led to an exogenous increase in the number of
non-EU immigrants arriving in Denmark in each year. The instrument then allocates these immigrants
to municipalities where previous immigrants from the same country lived in 1990, when immigrant
location decisions were often determined by the Spatial Dispersal Policy.27 More specifically, the
predicted non-EU immigrant share is calculated as follows:
ImgIV non−EUmt =
∑
d
Fdt ∗ (Fmd90/Fd90)
Pm90
(2)
where Fdt is the national stock of immigrants from a non-EU country d in year t. These immigrants
are allocated to municipalities based on the share of migrants from the same country d in year 1990
(i.e., Fmd90/Fd90). The instrument is exploiting the exogenous shock to aggregate immigrant inflows,
variation in the initial random dispersion of immigrants in 1990, and the subsequent tendencies for new
migrants to locate in migrant enclaves. By construction, the instrument is not a function of changing
local economic conditions. This product is then normalized by total employment in the municipality
in 1990 (Pm90) and summed across all foreign countries d to generate predicted immigration at the
26Since we exclude firms that relocate domestically, many of the results are identical if just firm fixed effects are
included rather than firm fixed effects and municipality fixed effects.
27Of course the dispersal policy did not apply to all non-EU immigrants, however immigrant location decisions that
were determined by this program are even more exogenous than is typically assumed by common ‘shift share’ instrument.
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Figure 9: Immigration and the Immigration Instrument
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municipality-year level.28
Figure 9 plots the share of non-EU immigrants within a municipality against the immigration
instrument. A significant positive relationship is evident which verifies that our instrument is a strong
predictor of immigration within a municipality. This provides preliminary visual confirmation of the
standard first-stage IV results reported later.
The threats to this common ‘shift share’ instrumental variable approach are less relevant in the
Danish context. First, typically there are concerns that the national stock of immigrants from coun-
try d, Fdt, could be driven by domestic conditions that are endogenous. However, in Denmark, as
discussed, the large inflow of non-EU immigrants during this period was largely driven by instability
and policy changes in foreign countries.
Second, it is possible that the initial distribution of immigrants across municipalities in the pre-
sample year could have been driven by endogenous economic conditions that then persisted over
time. While this seems unlikely in the Danish context due to the random Spatial Dispersal Policy,
we nonetheless test for this potential violation of our exclusion restriction in Table 3. We find that
long-run changes in our immigration instrument are uncorrelated with pre-sample trends in offshoring
28See Foged and Peri (2016) for additional details and the benefits of using this common approach in the Danish
setting.
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within a municipality. In particular, the change in the instrument from 1995 to 2011 is unrelated
to the pre-1995 trend in the extensive margin of offshoring (column 1) or the pre-1995 trend in the
intensive margin of offshoring (column 2). Consistent with the stated goals of the Spatial Dispersal
Policy, we find no evidence that the geographic distribution of predicted immigration was driven by
pre-sample trends in economic conditions within a municipality.
We do find, however, that changes in our instrumental variable are correlated with changes in the
share of non-EU immigration in column 3. Specifically, long-run changes in the instrument have a
statistically significant positive impact on long-run changes in the share of non-EU immigration within
the municipality. This provides additional evidence that the instrument is successful at predicting
actual immigration inflows. As a placebo test, column 4 confirms that long-run changes in our non−EU
immigrant instrument are orthogonal to long-run changes in the share of EU immigration. Not
surprisingly, predicted immigration from non-EU countries is a poor indicator of actual immigration
from EU countries.
The final two columns of Table 3 pursue a reduced form specification, which examines the rela-
tionship between the immigration instrument and the extensive and intensive margins of offshoring.
These findings show that exogenous long-run changes in predicted immigration has a significant neg-
ative impact on long-run changes in the extensive (column 5) and intensive (column 6) margins of
offshoring. This provides preliminary evidence of the labor supply effect which will be tested more
formally in the next section.
Overall the results in Table 3 support the validity of our exclusion restriction, they verify that the
instrument is a good predictor of non-EU immigration but not of EU immigration, and they provide
preliminary evidence that immigration does influence offshoring decisions. The unique features of
the Danish immigration experience provides an appealing quasi-natural experiment and makes this
relatively common instrumental variable approach even more compelling.
4 Aggregate Labor Supply Results
This section discusses our results that test for the labor supply effect. First, we examine whether an
influx of immigrants decreases the likelihood that firms begin to offshore jobs abroad (i.e. the extensive
margin). Then we focus on whether immigration decreases offshoring volumes, conditional on the
firm offshoring at all (i.e. the intensive margin). A subsequent subsection then focuses on whether
immigration has a heterogeneous impact on offshoring across different types of Danish industries.
4.1 Extensive Margin
We begin by estimating the impact of non-EU immigration on the extensive margin of offshoring, after
controlling for industry, municipality, and year fixed effects. Even in this relatively basic specification
reported in column 1 of Table 4, we see that an increase in the share of non-EU immigration within
a municipality leads to a significant decrease in the probability that a firm within that municipality
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will offshore. The immigration coefficient of -0.303 implies that a one standard deviation increase
immigration leads to a subsequent decrease in the probability that a firm will offshore by 4.7 percent.29
This implied effect is reported in brackets beneath the standard error, which for ease of interpretation
we list in all of our subsequent specifications.
Before proceeding with even more sophisticated linear probability models, we first quickly verify
that similar results are obtained using an alternate probit specification.30 Column 2 reports the
estimated marginal effect from this probit specification. Reassuringly, we see that the immigration
coefficients in the linear probability model (column 1) and the probit model (column 2) are both
negative, significant, and similar in magnitude (4.7 percent versus 3.2 percent). With our results
confirmed using this alternate probit specification, we now return to our preferred linear probability
specification.
Columns 3-5 of Table 4 sequentially add firm fixed effects, additional firm-level characteristics
(including productivity, capital intensity, foreign ownership, size, and multi-establishment), and then
finally workforce composition characteristics (including gender, education, age, tenure, and experi-
ence) to the estimation equation. The key immigration coefficient of interest in columns 3-5 remains
similar after controlling for these numerous firm and the workforce characteristics. Specifically, the
immigration point estimates fall within the narrow range of -0.334 to -0.349 and are precisely esti-
mated. The immigration coefficient of -0.349 in the most rigorous specification in column 5 implies
that a one standard deviation increase in immigration leads to a 5.4 percent decrease in the probability
of offshoring (see the coefficient in brackets).
The estimated impact of the other firm-level characteristics are sensible. For instance, in columns 4
and 5 we see that more productive firms are more likely to offshore. This is consistent with abundant
evidence that shows that only the most productive firms can overcome the fixed costs associated
with globalization (Melitz, 2003; Helpman et al., 2004). Furthermore, by explicitly accounting for
productivity in Table 4 we control for the possibility that immigration can alter firm productivity
which in turn could influence offshoring decisions. Note that the estimated impact of immigration
on offshoring is similar regardless of whether productivity and other firm characteristics are included
(compare columns 3 and 4). We also find, not surprisingly, that offshoring is increasing with the
capital intensity of the firm and the foreign ownership of the firm, as well as our firm size and multi-
establishment binary variables (unreported).
In column 6, we turn to our instrumental variable approach to address endogeneity concerns. The
first-stage results, which are reported in the bottom panel of column 6, show that the instrument has
a significant positive impact on immigration. The first stage f-stat is above 10 indicating a relatively
29Multiplying the standard deviation of immigration by the estimated coefficient generates a -0.006 (=0.020*-0.303)
change in offshoring. This change represents a 4.7 percent decrease in the extensive margin of offshoring relative to the
mean of the dependent variables (0.13) which is reported in the bottom panel of Table 4.
30Following the existing literature (Damm and Dustmann, 2014; Miguel et al., 2004) we prefer the flexibility of the
linear probability model, especially since our analysis includes a large number of fixed effects (over 20,000 firm fixed
effects) and instruments for immigration, both of which are more challenging in a probit specification. The linear
probability model is unbiased and consistent as long as few of the predicted probabilities lie outside the unit interval
(Horrace and Oaxaca, 2006). Moreover, Angrist and Pischke (2010) deem the linear probability model as a preferable
approach especially when the nature of the non-linear model is unknown.
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strong first stage which is consistent with the results in Figure 9 and Table 3. Variation in immi-
gration driven by foreign ‘push factors’, the Spatial Dispersal Policy, and the enclave hypothesis are
strong predictors of actual immigration within Denmark. The second-stage results again show that
immigration significantly reduces the likelihood of offshoring, but they now carry a causal interpreta-
tion. Specifically, a one standard deviation in immigration leads to a subsequent 12.7 percent decline
in the probability that a firm within that municipality will offshore. This is a sizable effect which
is comparable in magnitude to the impact of a one standard deviation increase in firm productivity
which leads to a 9.8 percent increase in offshoring.31 Thus, we find that immigration is actually one
of the most important determinants of offshoring.32
The immigration coefficient in the IV specification in column 6 is larger in magnitude than the
analogous OLS coefficient reported in column 5. This is consistent with the most obvious source of
endogeneity, which predicts that as some municipalities become more global they will attract more
migrant workers and local firms will be more likely to offshore. As a result there is a spurious positive
bias in the OLS coefficient reported in column 5. Our instrumental variable approach addresses this
issue and thus in column 6 the causal impact of immigration on offshoring is more negative. Overall,
Table 4 confirms that the labor supply effect is important by showing that immigration has a significant
negative impact on the extensive margin of offshoring.
4.2 Intensive Margin
We also examine the impact of immigration on the intensive margin of offshoring. Table 5 uses
as the dependent variable the logarithm of offshoring volumes, conditional on the firm offshoring
at all. In column 1 we find that an increase in the share of non-EU immigrants in a municipality
significantly reduces the volume of offshoring, after accounting for only industry, municipality, and
year fixed effects. Columns 2-4 then sequentially include firm fixed effects, firm characteristics, and
workforce characteristics as well. In all of these specifications, the results show that immigration
significantly reduces the intensive margin of offshoring. The range of point estimates in columns 2-4
is narrow (varying from -5.9 to -6.2) and they are all precisely estimated. The interpretation of this
coefficient, reported in brackets, is that a one standard deviation increase in immigration leads to a
1.0 - 1.1 percent decline in the amount of firm-level offshoring within that municipality. Productivity
is found to increases the intensive margin of offshoring while capital intensity and foreign ownership
are insignificant.
While the numerous controls and fixed effects reduce endogeneity concerns, they do not eliminate
them entirely and thus we now turn to our instrumental variable approach in Column 5. The IV results
show that immigration has a significant negative impact on offshoring volumes.33 A one standard
31Given the estimated coefficient on productivity (0.015), a one standard deviation increase in productivity (0.852) is
associated with a 9.8 percent increase in the probability of offshoring.
32Section 6.2 and Table 9 show that these results are similar if other measures of immigration are used, including total
immigration, refugee and new-EU immigration, non-EU low-skilled immigration, or non-EU firm-level immigration.
33The first-stage coefficient on the instrument is significant and positive as expected (see the bottom panel of column
5), but the first-stage F-stat on the instrument is weaker.
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deviation increase in immigration decreases the intensive margin of offshoring by 2.1 percent.34 This
is a sizable effect that is consistent with the impact of productivity, which is found to increase the
intensive margin of offshoring by 1.9 percent.
The immigration coefficient in the IV specification (column 5) is larger than the analogous OLS
coefficient (column 4), which is again consistent with a spurious positive bias in the OLS coefficient.
Once this source of endogeneity is accounted for with our instrumental variable approach, we find a
more negative impact of immigration on offshoring. We also find that immigration has a stronger
impact on the extensive margin of offshoring compared to the intensive margin. A one standard
deviation increase in immigration increases the extensive margin of offshoring by 12.7 percent (see
column 6 of Table 4) and increases the intensive margin of offshoring by 2.1 percent (see column 5 of
Table 5). These findings are consistent with evidence showing that extensive margin adjustments are
crucial in understanding firms’ participation in global markets (Bernard et al., 2007).
Overall the results reported in Table 4 and 5 provide compelling evidence that immigration and
offshoring are indeed substitutes. An exogenous influx of immigrants reduces both the likelihood
that firms will begin to offshore production activities abroad (Table 4) and the volume of offshoring,
conditional on the firm already offshoring (Table 5). These findings confirm the labor supply effect,
by showing that firms located in municipalities that experience an exogenous influx of foreign workers
have less need to relocate domestic production activities abroad. In a fundamental sense, the foreign
workers are migrating to the firms rather than the jobs being relocated abroad.
4.3 Industry Specific Results
Our analysis includes firms in all private-sector industries to capture as broad a segment of the Danish
economy as possible, which we view as an important contribution relative to existing studies which
often focus on either manufacturing or service industries. In this section, we examine whether the
observed relationship between immigration and offshoring differs systematically across various sectors
of the economy.
First, we examine whether immigration differentially affects offshoring in service and manufactur-
ing industries (see Hummels et al. (2014) for a discussion of how offshoring could vary across these
sectors).35 While the industry fixed effects in our main analysis should account for time-invariant
differences across industries, Table 6 goes further by separately reporting results for manufacturing
and service industries. Exogenous immigrant inflows lead to a significant decrease in the likelihood
34Multiplying the standard deviation of immigration (0.02) by the estimated coefficient (-12.064) generates an effect of
-0.241. This represents a 2.1 percent decrease in the intensive margin of offshoring relative to the mean of the dependent
variable (11.409) which is reported at the bottom of Table 5.
35Another interesting issue is that former manufacturing firms may offshore most or all of their production activities
and thus be classified as a service firm. These “factoryless goods producing” firms (FGPFs) are companies that no longer
control production and assembly in-house but are still involved in design, R&D, engineering, supervision of third-party
production, branding, marketing and distribution (Bernard and Fort, 2015). Firms switching from manufacturing to
service industries is important in explaining the decline in Danish manufacturing employment (Bernard et al., 2017b).
This type of extreme offshoring is not necessarily problematic for our analysis but it does provide an additional incentive
to separately examine the impact of immigration on offshoring at manufacturing firms and at service/FGP firms.
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that both manufacturing firms (column 1) and service firms (column 2) will offshore.36 While the
immigration coefficients differ (-1.117 in columns 1 and -0.647 in column 2), the implied magnitude
of this effect is comparable across the two sectors given the different means of the dependent vari-
ables. As seen in brackets, a one standard deviation increase in immigration reduces the probability
of offshoring by 12.8 percent for manufacturing firms and by 13.5 percent for service firms.
Second, we examine whether the offshoring decisions at firms in labor intensive industries are more
sensitive to an exogenous influx of foreign workers. We suspect that the offshoring decisions of firms
that rely on capital intensive production methods will be less responsive to an immigrant-induced
labor supply shock. Thus in columns 3 and 4 we split industries according to their labor intensity,
as an additional check on the plausibility of our results.37 Although the immigration coefficient is
similar in both columns, the implied magnitude of this effect is quite different. As seen in brackets, a
one standard deviation increase in immigration reduces the probability of offshoring by 38.1 percent
for firms in labor intensive industries but by only 8.1 percent for firms in capital intensive industries.
This confirms that the offshoring decisions of firms in labor-intensive industries are more sensitive to
an influx of foreign workers.
Third, the feasibility of offshoring likely differs across industries as well. Offshoring is easier in
industries that are more codifiable and routine like Motor Vehicles and Machinery and Equipment
than in industries that require more face-to-face contact like Health Care and Accommodation and
Food Services (Levy and Murnane, 2006; Becker et al., 2013). While similar in spirit to our previous
analysis, rather than focusing on the labor to capital distinction, here we focus on the types of tasks
that workers do and how susceptible these tasks are to offshoring. Thus, in columns 5 and 6 we
explore whether offshoring is more responsive to immigration in some high-offshoring sectors than in
others.38 The results indicate that a standard deviation increase in immigration leads to a 13.5 percent
increase in offshoring in sectors where offshoring is more feasible but only a 5.5 percent increase in
other low-offshoring sectors.
Overall, Table 6 shows that the impact of immigration on offshoring varies in sensible ways across
different sectors. We find that immigration has a similar impact on offshoring in manufacturing and
service industries, which is consistent with the fact offshoring is possible in both manufacturing and
service industries (Blinder, 2006). However, we also find that immigration disproportionately effects
offshoring in labor intensive industries and in industries where offshoring is more feasible. The fact
that our results are strongest in the anticipated places is reassuring.
36In Table 6 (and in subsequent tables) we focus on our preferred IV results and use the extensive margin of offshoring
(narrow definition) as the dependent variable. Other specifications generate similar results.
37Labor (capital) intensive industries are those with an average capital intensity below (above) the mean in 2003 (i.e.
the midpoint of our sample). The results are robust to other definitions of labor and capital intensive industries.
38High offshoring industries are those with average offshoring volumes that are above the mean in 2003 (i.e. the
midpoint of our sample). The results are robust to other definitions.
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5 Bilateral Network Results
We are interested in whether immigration also generates a network effect which should increase off-
shoring to the immigrant’s country of origin. Although we find that immigration and offshoring are
substitutes at the multilateral level, they may be complements at the bilateral level. Immigrants often
have connections and knowledge of the business environment in the foreign country that could prove
useful for Danish companies. The firm may draw this expertise and these networks in order to help
facilitate offshoring to the immigrant’s country of origin.
To investigate this hypothesis we first present descriptive evidence showing the origin countries of
Danish immigrants and the destination countries of Danish offshoring. Specifically, the top panel of
Figure 10 shows the non-EU countries with the largest percent increase in immigration from 1995 to
2011. As we saw in Figure 2 there are large influxes of immigrants from countries experiencing conflict
and instability (such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq) and from new-EU countries (like Bulgaria,
Romania, and Poland). We then compare these high-immigrant countries to those countries with the
largest percent increase in offshoring from 1995 to 2011. The bottom panel of Figure 10 shows the
important destinations of Danish offshoring over this period, which includes countries like Romania
and Bulgaria.
Many top immigrant source countries are also important destination countries of offshoring, which
suggests that there may be a bilateral relationship between these two global forces. For instance,
six countries (i.e. Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, former Yugoslavia, China, and Poland) are both
top immigration and top offshoring countries. To explore this relationship more carefully, Figure
11 plots bilateral offshoring against bilateral immigration after accounting for foreign country fixed
effects and year fixed effects. A statistically significant positive relationship is evident, indicating that
immigration from a particular foreign country is positively associated with offshoring to the same
non-EU country. This provides preliminary evidence suggesting that immigration generates a network
effect that increases offshoring to the immigrant’s country of origin.
To test for the bilateral network effect more formally we adopt a similar empirical specification to
the one outlined in Equation (1). However, instead of examining the impact of multilateral immigration
on multilateral offshoring, we now focus on the impact of bilateral immigration on bilateral offshoring.
Thus, we estimate the following equation, where offshoring and immigration now also vary at the
foreign country level:
Offnon−EUijmdt = β0 + β1Img
non−EU
mdt−1 +X
′
ijmt−1δ1 +W
′
ijmt−1δ2 + γi + γj + γm + γt + γd + ijmdt (3)
The dependent variable, Offijmtd, is now offshoring to a particular destination country d by firm
i, in industry j, located in municipality m, and in year t. Imgnon−EUmdt−1 represents the immigrant
share of workers from country d in municipality m and in year t. Given our focus on exogenous
non-EU immigration, offshoring is also restricted to non-EU countries in this bilateral specification.
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Figure 10: Immigration and Offshoring at the Bilateral Level
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Notes: The percent change between 1995 and 2011 in the number of migrant workers is reported
in the top panel by non-EU country. The percent change between 1995 and 2011 in the share of
offshoring firms is reported in the bottom panel by non-EU country.
Destination country fixed effects (γd) are now included in addition to the full set of firm characteristics
(Xijmt−1), workforce characteristics (Wijmt−1), and fixed effects (γi, γj , γm, and γt) from before. The
immigration instrument is constructed in the manner outlined in equation (2), except that it is now
calculated at the bilateral level, and we continue to cluster our standard errors at the municipality
level.39
Equation (3) is well-suited to test for the bilateral network effect. For instance, this specification
examines whether Polish immigrants within a municipality lead to a subsequent increase in the like-
lihood that local Danish firms offshore to Poland. However, in this bilateral specification the labor
supply effect identified previously will be weaker since immigration from any one foreign country is
unlikely to increase the local labor supply enough to influence offshoring decisions. In contrast, in
equation (1) the labor supply effect is strong since multilateral immigration can have an important
impact on local labor supply but the potential network effects are diluted. For instance, immigrants
39The instrument is the same as before expect that we do not sum across foreign countries (d) as we did in equation
(2)
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Figure 11: Immigration and Offshoring at the Bilateral Level (Controlling for FE)
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Notes: Bilateral offshoring is plotted against bilateral immigration after accounting
for foreign country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Offshoring is measured as the
share of Danish firms that offshore to a particular foreign country and immigration
is measured as the share of migrant workers within Denmark from the same non-EU
country.
from any one country (i.e. Poland) are unlikely to have networks that prove useful in offshoring to
other foreign countries (i.e. China). Pursuing both multilateral and bilateral empirical strategies
allows us to disentangle the labor supply and network effects, which provides a more complete picture
of how immigration impacts offshoring.
Results from estimating equation (3) are reported in Table 7.40 The bottom panel of column
1 indicates that our instrumental variable remains a strong predictor of actual immigration at the
bilateral level (the first-stage f-stat is above 20). The second-stage results, reported above, indicate
that immigration from a particular foreign country significantly increases the likelihood that firms
within that municipality will offshore to the same foreign country. A one standard deviation increase
(0.003) in bilateral immigration increases the probability that a firm offshores to the immigrant’s
country of origin by 24.4 percent (see the bracketed term). This provides compelling evidence that
immigration and offshoring are indeed complements at the bilateral level, as predicted by the network
effect.
We are interested in the underlying cause of this positive bilateral effect. Perhaps immigrants
40This is a more data intensive specification with the number of observations rising to over 20 million since the unit of
analysis now also varies by destination country.
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possess language skills that are useful for firms that wish to offshore or maybe immigrants have
networks and connections that help facilitate offshoring. We examine whether there is empirical
evidence supporting either of these explanations. Specifically, we estimate whether offshoring to
country X responds to immigration from countries that share the same language as country X (not
including country X itself). For example, Argentinian immigrants may have Spanish language skills
that help Danish firms offshore to Mexico.41 In addition, we examine whether offshoring to country
X responds to immigration from countries that are in the same geographic region as country X (not
including country X itself). For example, Argentinian immigrants may have networks or knowledge
of the business environment that help facilitate offshoring to Brazil.42
Column 2 of Table 7 reports results showing the impact of immigrant language skills and regional
networks on offshoring. The findings show that bilateral offshoring is unresponsive to immigration from
countries that speak the same language. However, bilateral offshoring does increase with immigration
from the same geographic region. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in immigration from
other countries within the same region increases the likelihood that firms offshore to that specific coun-
try by 26.8 percent. These results suggest that the positive bilateral relationship between immigration
and offshoring is more likely driven by networks and knowledge of the business environment than by
linguistic advantages.43
Is it possible to reconcile the negative relationship between immigration and offshoring found at
the multilateral level (see column 6 of Table 4) with the positive relationship found at the bilateral level
(see column 1 of Table 7)? We examine this issue by including in column 3 the bilateral immigrant share
from country X and the immigrant share from all other foreign countries (not including country X
itself). We find that offshoring to country X is increasing with immigration from country X consistent
with the network effect but it is decreasing with immigration from all other foreign countries consistent
with the labor supply effect. The magnitude of the bilateral network effect is similar (21.8 percent
in column 3 versus 24.4 percent in column 1) and the magnitude of the aggregate labor supply effect
is also similar (7.6 percent in column 3 versus 12.7 percent in column 6 of Table 4).44 Overall, the
results in column 3 verify that at the bilateral level immigration generates a network effect which
complements offshoring, while at the multilateral level immigration generates a labor supply effect
that substitutes for immigration.
These results contribute to the existing literature by clarifying and reconciling some conflicting
findings. Our findings are consistent with the substitutability of multilateral immigration and off-
41Immigrants are classified into one of 32 linguistic groups corresponding to the third level of the linguistic family
tree in the Ethnologue data. We identify employees’ linguistic background with the dominant language spoken in their
country of origin (see Parrotta et al. (2016) for more details).
42Immigrants are grouped according to the World Bank geographical areas: North Africa; West Africa; Central Africa;
East Africa; South Africa; Sub-saharan Africa; Caribbean; North America; Central America; South America; Central
Asia; East Asia; South Asia; South-East Asia; West Asia; Eastern Europe; and Oceania.
43Simultaneously instrumenting for bilateral immigrant shares (from column 1) along with the linguistic and regional
shares (from column 2) not surprisingly weakens the first stages. Thus, we do not attempt to instrument for all three
endogenous variables at the same time.
44The magnitude of the labor supply effect here in Table 7 is smaller presumably because this specification only
estimates the impact of multilateral immigration on offshoring to a single foreign country rather than offshoring to all
foreign countries as in Table 4.
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shoring found in Ottaviano et al. (2013). However, our results differ from Ottaviano et al. (2018) who
find that immigration and offshoring are complements at the multilateral level but substitutes at the
bilateral level. Their findings indicate, for instance, that Pakistani immigrants reduce offshoring only
to Pakistan but actually increase offshoring to India and other foreign countries via a productivity
effect. They explain this result by assuming that service tasks can only be carried out by either Pak-
istani immigrants domestically or by offshoring to Pakistan, which generates a substitution effect at
the bilateral level. In contrast, we implicitly assume a more flexible production process that does not
require tasks to be country-specific. Our findings support this assertion by showing, for instance, that
Pakistani immigrants reduce the need for firms to offshore to other countries (due to the new supply
of immigrant workers within the municipality) but increase offshoring to Pakistan (due to immigrant
networks).45
The extensive margin results in columns 1-3 of Table 7 indicate that bilateral immigration helps
domestic firms overcome the fixed costs associated with initially offshoring to the immigrant’s country
of origin. Immigrants’ knowledge and connections are apparently useful for the firm in setting up stages
of the production process abroad. However, once the Danish firm is already producing in the foreign
country, we anticipate that additional immigration from this country will have little impact on the
intensive margin of offshoring because the firm has already made business connections abroad. Thus,
as a quasi-placebo test, we replicate our bilateral specifications but use as the dependent variable
the logarithm of the volume of offshoring. The results from this exercise are reported in columns
4-6 of Table 7 and show that the intensive margin of offshoring to country X is not sensitive to
immigration from country X. This verifies that once the firm has already set up production activities
in a particular foreign country, additional immigration from that country has no discernible impact on
offshoring. However, in column 6 immigration from all other countries does still reduce the intensive
margin of bilateral offshoring and the magnitude of this effect (2.5 percent shown in brackets) is
similar to our previous results (2.1 percent found in column 5 of Table 5). We find it reassuring that
our results are significant in the anticipated places but insignificant along other sensible dimensions.
Overall the results in Table 7 verify that immigration generates a bilateral network effect that increases
the extensive margin of offshoring but has no impact on the intensive margin of offshoring.
6 Extensions
6.1 Immigration and International Trade
While our primary interest is to examine the relationship between immigration and offshoring, this
section explores how immigration affects another component of globalization, namely international
trade. We begin by examining the multilateral impact of immigration on exports and imports and
then we focus on the bilateral relationship. We anticipate that the immigrant connections that en-
45The discrepancy between our findings and Ottaviano et al. (2018) may be driven by their focus on the offshoring of
service tasks at a sample of firms in U.K. service industries, where they argue there is a high degree of country specificity
in service tasks. In contrast, we focus on the offshoring of production tasks at the universe of firms across all industries.
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couraged offshoring may also increase bilateral imports and exports, which will be a useful check of
our network effect results. Furthermore, confirming in our context existing findings that show that bi-
lateral immigration increases bilateral trade (Gould, 1994; Head and Ries, 1998; Rauch and Trindade,
2002; Peri and Requena-Silvente, 2010) will lend credibility to our new offshoring results.
In addition to it’s impact on offshoring, multilateral immigration may also increase consumption
and thus imports, simply due to the larger population in the municipality. This will lead to an
increase in a broad range of imported goods, and not just those specific products that happen to be
produced by firms within the municipality, which is the focus of our offshoring measure. The negative
offshoring effect coupled with this potentially positive consumption-based impact, means that the
impact of immigration on total imports is ambiguous. It is also possible that multilateral immigration
generates a ‘productivity effect’ which can increase exports from a particular municipality (Ottaviano
et al., 2018). However, since we control for firm productivity we expect that immigration will have a
minimal impact on total exports.
To test these predictions, we examine whether an exogenous influx of immigrants leads to an
increase in total imports into a municipality or total exports from a municipality. In column 1 of
Table 8, we find that an exogenous increase in immigration has no significant impact on imports.
Given that imports decrease due to a decline in offshoring but they can rise with an immigrant-
induced increase in population, this insignificant result is not surprising. More importantly this result
indicates that our import-based measure of offshoring does indeed reflect offshoring decisions and is
not simply capturing a more general relationship between immigration and total imports.46 Column
2 of Table 8 shows that an exogenous influx of immigrants into a municipality does not influence
total exports either. We conclude that there is little evidence that immigration influences multilateral
imports or exports within municipalities in Denmark.
As we did with offshoring, we now focus on the impact of bilateral immigration on imports and
exports to the immigrant’s country of origin. We suspect that the knowledge and connections that
help domestic firms offshore to the immigrant’s country of origin (see Table 7) may also help facilitate
trade with this foreign country as well. Furthermore, immigrants often prefer familiar goods that they
grew up consuming, which may also increase imports from the immigrant’s country of origin (Atkin,
2016).
We test these predictions by examining how municipality-level trade with country X is effected
by an increase in immigration from country X or an increase in immigration from all other countries
(excluding country X). Consistent with our network effect hypothesis, column 3 of Table 8 shows that
an exogenous influx of immigrants from country X increases municipality imports from country X.
Specifically, a one standard deviation increase immigration from country X leads to a 16.6 percent
increase in the volume of imports from the same country. We also find in column 3 that immigration
from other countries has no bearing on imports from country X, which is consistent with the findings
in column 1. The results in column 3 confirm that while the network effect increases imports from the
46To the extent that our offshoring measure does inadvertently capture broader consumption-based increases in imports,
this will attenuate our negative results in Tables 3 and 4
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immigrant’s country of origin it does not influence imports from other foreign countries.
In column 4 of Table 8 we find that the network effect also increases exports to the immigrant’s
country of origin. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the share of immigrants from
country X increases exports to the same country by 13.7 percent. However, we find that immigrants
from other countries have no bearing on exports to country X which is consistent with the findings in
column 2. This indicates that immigrant’s knowledge and connections are useful in facilitating trade
with their country of origin but not with other foreign countries. This former result confirms evidence
on the bilateral relationship between immigration and trade found in a variety of other settings (Gould,
1994; Head and Ries, 1998; Rauch and Trindade, 2002; Peri and Requena-Silvente, 2010) and it makes
our new offshoring results even more compelling.47
Overall, Table 8 provides insight into the relationship between immigration and international
trade at both the multilateral and bilateral level. We find little evidence that immigration influences
multilateral imports or exports. However, bilateral immigration does increase imports and exports
to the immigrant’s country of origin, which confirms that the network effect not only leads to more
offshoring (Table 7) but also increases trade (Table 8). We are encouraged that the results in Table 8
are sensible and consistent with existing findings.
6.2 Immigration Measures
Given exogenous ‘push factors’ in many non-EU countries and the Spatial Dispersal Policy which
exclusively effected non-EU refugees, our analysis focuses on the non-EU immigrant population (see
section 2.2). This section examines whether our results hold using narrower or broader groups of
Danish immigrants. Specifically, column 1 of Table 9 uses as the independent variable the share of
all foreign workers in the municipality, including both EU and non-EU immigrants. We construct an
analogous instrument using predicted immigration from all foreign countries. This represents a more
comprehensive measure of immigration within a Danish municipality but sacrifices the exogenous fea-
tures of non-EU immigration. Nonetheless, the first-stage and second-stage IV results in column 1, are
similar to the non-EU results re-reported in column 2 for comparison purposes. Specifically, offshoring
increases by 14.8 percent in response to a one standard deviation increase in total immigration and
by 12.7 percent in response to a one standard deviation increase in non-EU immigration (see the
bracketed coefficients in columns 1 and 2). The similarity of these results is consistent with the fact
that non-EU immigration is the driving force behind changes in total immigration over this period, as
shown in Figure 1.
The remaining specifications in columns 3-5 of Table 9 focus on narrower definitions of immigra-
tion. In column 3, we focus on migrants from either refugee countries or new European Union member
countries.48 This more carefully identifies foreign workers that migrated to Denmark due to exoge-
47While most studies find that immigration increases both bilateral imports and exports, Ottaviano et al. (2018) find
that immigrant networks increase bilateral exports but not bilateral imports in U.K. service industries.
48Our refugee countries include Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Iran, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and the former
Yugoslavia (following Foged and Peri (2016)) and the new-EU countries include Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta who joined the EU in 2004 and Bulgaria,
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nous foreign shocks and that were allocated to municipalities based on the Spatial Dispersal Policy.
However, it narrows the set of immigrants within a municipality that can potentially influence a firm’s
offshoring decision. The results in column 3 show that immigration, defined in this way, still has a
significant negative impact on offshoring which is similar in magnitude to the results reported in col-
umn 2 (12.2 percent versus 12.7 percent). Similar findings are also obtained if the non-EU immigrant
share is instrumented with the refugee and new-EU immigrant IV.49
We also examine how Danish firms respond to lower-skilled immigration in particular.50 Since
offshoring often entails the relocation of routine, blue-collar tasks abroad (Hummels et al., 2014;
Ebenstein et al., 2014; Becker et al., 2013), the offshoring decisions of Danish firms may be more
sensitive to an influx of lower-skilled foreign immigrants. The results in column 4 confirm that an
exogenous influx of lower-skilled non-EU immigrants significantly reduces the likelihood that Danish
firms within that municipality will offshore. As expected, the magnitude of this effect (17.6 percent
in column 4) is slightly larger than findings using all non-EU immigrants (12.7 percent in column 2).
Finally, column 5 focuses on the share of non-EU immigrants within the firm rather than within
the municipality. The instrument, however, still measures exogenous changes in non-EU immigration
at the municipality level. Using firm-level immigrant shares is more specific but the downside is that
firm hiring decisions are endogenous. In addition, immigration may influence offshoring decisions
without necessarily increasing the immigrant share at all firms, since some firms in equilibrium may
hire more natives. The weaker first-stage results in column 5, suggests that this latter concern may
be empirically relevant. However, the second-stage results indicate that an increase in immigrant
workers within the firm significant reduces firm-level offshoring. Overall, these findings show that
exogenous immigration shocks within a municipality influence firm-level immigrant shares within that
municipality, which in turn reduce the likelihood that firms offshore production activities abroad.
Ultimately, the results in Table 9 demonstrate that our findings are robust to a variety of alternate
definitions of immigration.
6.3 Offshoring Measures
We are encouraged by the fact that our offshoring measure is consistent with a totally different survey-
based measure of offshoring (see Figure 4 and Bernard et al. (2017a)) and that it does not appear
to be picking up broader effects of immigration on imports more generally (see section 6.1). As a
further check, this section examines the extent to which our results are robust to alternate offshoring
measures. We begin by utilizing a “broad offshoring” measure which, as discussed in section 2.3, is
defined using firm imports in all product categories not just those within the same HS4 code as firm
production. As shown in column 1 of Table 10, using this alternate offshoring variable generates similar
results. A standard deviation increase in immigration leads to a subsequent 12.3 percent decrease in
the probability that a firm within that municipality will offshore.
and Romania who joined in 2007.
49These results are available upon request.
50Lower-skilled workers are defined as those with either a primary education or two years of vocational education.
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Second, we construct a conceptually distinct measure of offshoring using a completely different data
set administered by the National Bank of Denmark (Esperian). This data has firm-level information on
outward foreign direct investment (FDI) of Danish multinationals in both manufacturing and service
industries. An analogous extensive margin offshoring measure is defined as whether the Danish firm
has any majority owned foreign affiliates abroad. The benefit of this measure is that it captures
offshoring whose output is sold back to Denmark as well as offshoring whose output is sold in foreign
markets (our main measure of offshoring does not include this latter component). However, the
downside of this approach is that it misses offshoring to foreign arms-length suppliers that are outside
the boundaries of the firm (which is a component of offshoring that our main approach does capture).
In addition, foreign direct investment data is not available for all the firms in our sample which is a
potential drawback. The second column of Table 10 reports results using this alternate FDI-based
offshoring measure. Consistent with our earlier results, we find that an exogenous influx of immigrants
leads to a significant decrease in the likelihood that firms within that municipality offshore. While the
magnitude of this effect is smaller, it is negative and statistically significant. Overall, the fact that
we arrive at qualitatively similar results using a conceptually distinct measure of offshoring provides
external validity for our findings.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 10 shift the focus to the intensive margin of offshoring. Specifically, in
column 3 we use as the dependent variable the log of offshoring per employee, which scales offshoring
to firm size. We see that the impact of immigration on offshoring in column 3 (an effect of 3.4 percent)
remains similar to our main findings (an effect of 2.1 percent in column 5 of Table 5). This should not
be surprising given our analysis already controls for firm size and productivity. Column 4 explores
whether our intensive margin results, which conditions on the firm offshoring, could be influenced by
firm entry or exit from the sample. To address this concern we restrict the sample of firms to those
that offshore in all years. Despite the decrease in sample size, the estimated impact of immigration on
the intensive margin of offshoring remains significant and similar in magnitude to our main findings
(2.6 percent versus 2.1 percent). Overall, the results in Table 10 show that the impact of immigration
on the extensive and intensive margins of offshoring are robust to a variety of alternate definitions of
offshoring.
6.4 Additional Sensitivity Results
We are sensitive to concerns that outlier municipalities or firms may be influencing our results. For
instance, as the capital and largest city in Denmark, Copenhagen is likely to be an outlier along a
number of dimensions. While we already include municipality fixed effects, as an additional check of
our findings, column 1 of Table 11 excludes Copenhagen (and Frederiksberg) entirely from the analysis.
Reassuringly, the immigration coefficient remains negative, significant, and similar in magnitude (10.8
percent versus 12.7 percent) after Copenhagen is excluded from the sample.
In the second column of Table 11 we exclude firms with multiple establishments. Identifying the
geographic location of these firms is more challenging and using the headquarter municipality as a
proxy may introduce measurement error into our analysis. However, multi-establishment firms account
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for only 9 percent of our sample and we do include a multi-establishment binary variable as a control
in all of our specifications. As we see in column 2, the immigration point estimate remains significant
and similar in sign and magnitude after dropping these multi-establishment firms from the sample. A
one standard deviation increase in immigration reduces the likelihood that single-establishment firms
offshore by 15.9 percent (compared to 12.7 percent for all firms).
Our main analysis excludes firms that moved from one municipality to another within Denmark.
This ensures that changes in the share of non-EU immigrants captures variation over time within the
same municipality and does not reflect the possibility that the firm has relocated. However, in column
3 we include these firms relocated and find similar results. If anything, the impact of immigration on
offshoring is now a bit larger (18.1 percent versus 12.7 percent). Overall, a one standard deviation
increase in immigration leads to a 11-18 percent increase in offshoring across the different specifications
shown in Table 11. We conclude that our results are robust to different samples of municipalities and
firms.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of immigration on firm-level offshoring decisions. We utilize a detailed
employer-employee matched data set covering the universe of Danish firms and workers over the
period 1995-2011. A number of features of Danish immigration during this period provide a unique
opportunity to identify the causal impact of immigrant inflows on subsequent firm-level offshoring
decisions. Our results provide new insights into the relationship between arguably the two most
controversial components of globalization.
First, we find that an exogenous increase in immigration leads to a significant decrease in firm-level
offshoring at both the extensive and intensive margins. Consistent with our aggregate labor supply
effect, this result indicates that an influx of foreign immigrant workers reduces the need for firms
to relocate production activities to foreign countries. In other words immigration and offshoring are
substitutes. As expected, this relationship is stronger in industries that are more labor intensive and
in industries where offshoring is more feasible.
Second, a bilateral analysis confirms that immigration increases the likelihood that firms offshore
to the immigrant’s country of origin. Consistent with our network effect, this result indicates that
immigrants have connections in their country of origin that help the firm initially offshore to that
particular foreign country. However, once the firm has already set up production activities abroad
and made it’s own business connections, additional immigration from that country does not increase
the intensive margin of offshoring. Additional results reconcile our positive bilateral findings with our
negative multilateral results, by showing that bilateral offshoring is increasing with immigration from
the same country but decreasing with immigration from all other countries. Overall, we find that
immigration and offshoring are complements at the bilateral level but substitutes at the multilateral
level.
These findings carry important policy implications at a time when many countries are increasingly
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skeptical of both immigration and offshoring. Our key finding that immigration and offshoring are
substitutes, suggests that policies aimed at reducing immigration would have the unintended conse-
quence of encouraging firms to offshore jobs abroad and visa versa. Policy makers should be cognizant
of this important trade-off: either foreign workers immigrate to perform the jobs domestically or the
jobs themselves are offshored to be performed by foreign workers abroad.
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